Deep dive · Premier League football · Accounts to June 2025

Inside the accounts · How does Tottenham Hotspur really make its money?

£23.4m of Tottenham's £72.7m finance bill was its owner's warrant rising in value

Tottenham won the Europa League in May 2025, its first major trophy since 2008, and finished 17th in the Premier League. The group's accounts for that season show £564.9m of revenue and a £94.7m loss. They show what a stadium that hosts concerts and NFL games brings in, what the squad costs, how transfer fees are spread over years, and why £23.4m of the finance bill was nothing to do with the stadium debt. Where a figure says something about how the club is run, we explain it.

CompanyTottenham Hotspur Limited · 01706358

AccountsAccounts to June 2025 PDF ↗

ByJames Sproule · 28 September 2026

Reading time8 min read

£564.9mRevenue, up 9.1%

£94.7mLoss after tax, from £26.2m

£72.7mFinance costs, £23.4m of them the owner's warrant

45%Of revenue on staff: £255.8m

In 60 words

The answer

Running a Premier League club means spending more than comes in: Tottenham's costs came to £130.64 for every £100 of income in 2024/25. Staff took £45, transfer fees spread over contracts £26 and finance costs £12. Winning the Europa League added £33.4m of prize money, but finishing 17th cost £38.9m of TV income. The owner, ENIC, put in £35m, then £100m after the year end.

The rhythm of the business

How a season shows up in the accounts

The group runs a men's and a women's club and a stadium that works on non-match days too. The strategic report describes the aim as to "further diversify long term revenues" (p. 1). Four kinds of day each leave a mark in the notes.

Home game

Tickets and catering

Match receipts rose, "driven by an increased number of matches" at the stadium (p. 1), including the Europa League home games.

£126.5m match receipts

Every weekend

The league table

TV and media income fell, "driven by finishing in 17th position in the Premier League (2024: 5th position)" (p. 1).

£127.0m, down £38.9m

Thursday nights

Europe

The Europa League run brought prize money "of £34.7m (2024: £1.3m)" (p. 1), and the win put the club into the Champions League.

£34.7m UEFA prize money

No football

Concerts, NFL, boxing

Six Beyoncé shows, two NFL games, a rugby match and a boxing night were held at the stadium (p. 1), alongside tours, the Skywalk and F1 Drive.

£77.3m other commercial

The income statement

The club on one page

The accounts split the year in two: running the club and the stadium, and "football trading", the cost of buying players and the profit from selling them (p. 22). The first part made money. The second, plus the finance costs, turned it into a loss.

Running the club and the stadium: £565m in, £44m left, 2024/25Before any spending on players. 'Contract pay-offs' is the exceptional charge for onerous employment contracts.

Totals
Costs and charges
Income and credits

Income statement p22; note 3, p32.

From a £43.8m profit to a £94.7m loss£43.8m − £146.7m + £52.6m − £70.2m + £26.0m = −£94.7m. Orange takes away, green adds back.

Player amortisation and other football tradingthe cost of transfer fees, spread over each contract£146.7m

Net finance costsincluding £23.4m for the owner's warrant£70.2m

Profit on selling playersadded back£52.6m

Tax creditadded back£26.0m

Income statement p22; notes 6, 7 and 8, pp34–35.

£43.8m

profit from running the club and stadium before player trading, down from £74.6m. Running costs rose 15% to £521.5m, "driven by staff costs, hosting a larger number of football matches and third party events and the technology transformation project" (p. 2).

£120.6m

loss before tax, against £26.0m the year before. A £26.0m tax credit, almost all deferred tax, brought the loss after tax to £94.7m (p. 35).

For every £100 that came in, Spurs spent £130.64Per £100 of revenue and other income. Selling players and a tax credit brought the gap down to £16.75.

Staffsalaries, bonuses and National Insurance£45.25

Other running costsmatchdays, events, travel, technology and more£34.90

Player amortisation and football trading£25.95

Net finance costsinterest and the warrant£12.42

Depreciationmostly the stadium and training centre£10.05

Contract pay-offsexceptional£2.05

Back in: profit on selling players£9.30

Back in: tax credit£4.60

The loss£16.75

Income statement p22; notes 3 and 7, pp32–34. Our split.

What this means for the clubA club is judged on the pitch, and the costs that decide results, wages and transfer fees, are set before the season starts. Revenue then depends on where the team finishes. So a club can lose money in a year it wins a trophy. The report says the Board treats revenue and "profit from operations" as its key measures (p. 1), and that measure, before player trading and depreciation, fell from £144.9m to £112.3m.

Revenue

Where the money comes from

Commercial income is the biggest stream. £276.7m, 49% of revenue: sponsorship £160.0m (up from £144.5m), merchandising £39.3m and "other revenue" £77.3m (pp. 1 and 2).

Europe gave, the league took away. UEFA prize money rose by £33.4m. TV and media fell by £38.9m. On these two lines together, the club took £5.5m less than the season before, when it had no European football but finished 5th.

The stadium earns without football. Other revenue grew from £64.0m to £77.3m, from "hosting non-football events, an increase in memberships, the continued growth of our Stadium Tours, The Dare Skywalk, F1 Drive and conference and events businesses, a pre-season tour as well as matchday catering" (p. 2).

Where the £564.9m came fromCommercial income, £276.7m in total, is now almost half of revenue. Other income, not shown, fell from £10.4m to £0.4m.

2023/24
2024/25

Commercial: sponsorship£160.0m

TV and media17th in the league, from 5th£127.0m

Match receiptsmore games at the stadium£126.5m

Commercial: otherevents, tours, Skywalk, F1 Drive, catering£77.3m

Commercial: merchandising£39.3m

UEFA prize moneyEuropa League winners£34.7m

Note 2, p32; strategic report, pp1–2 (commercial split).

Background, not from the accountsPremier League TV money is shared partly in equal slices and partly by league position, through "merit payments" for each place in the table, and partly by how often a club is shown live in the UK. A club that drops from 5th to 17th loses merit money and usually some live games. Winning the Europa League also brings a place in the next season's Champions League, where prize money is higher. That money falls in 2025/26, not in these accounts.

What this means for the clubA stadium that can host concerts, NFL games and boxing earns on days when there is no football, so part of the income doesn't depend on results. Sponsors and season-ticket holders also pay ahead: the balance sheet carries £161.7m of deferred income due within a year and £45.5m later, cash received for seasons and deals not yet delivered (pp. 40 and 41).

Not disclosed. The accounts don't give separate figures for concerts, NFL, boxing, stadium tours or catering, or say how much of match receipts came from the Europa League home games. They don't give attendances or season-ticket numbers. Other income, outside revenue, fell from £10.4m to £0.4m, and the accounts don't say what the £10.4m was.

Staff

What the people cost

Staff costs rose 15%, to £255.8m. Salaries and bonuses were £222.8m and employer's National Insurance £31.9m, up from £25.5m (p. 34). That is 45.3% of revenue, up from 42.9%.

The club employed an average of 877 people: 335 players and football administration staff, 473 in stadium operations and support and 69 in retail and distribution, plus 617 temporary staff on match days (pp. 33 and 34).

On top of that, an exceptional £11.6m was charged for "onerous employment contracts and other employment related payments" (p. 32), against £1.5m the year before.

Staff costs rose 15% to £255.8m45p of every £1 of revenue, up from 43p. Excludes £11.6m of exceptional contract costs.

Salaries and bonuses
Employer's National Insurance
Pensions

Note 5, p34.

Who the 877 people areAverage employees in 2024/25, before 617 temporary match-day staff. Each square is 1%.

Stadium operations and support: 473
Players and football administration: 335
Retail and distribution: 69

Note 5, p33.

£7.9m

Directors' pay

Total pay for the directors, up from £5.1m. The highest-paid director received £5.8m, up from £3.7m. Non-executive directors were paid nothing (p. 34).

£6.7m

Loss of office

Paid to past directors "for loss of office", against nil the year before. The accounts don't say who it went to (p. 34).

£13.0m

Loyalty and incentive schemes

Charged for senior management schemes, up from £0.8m, with £15.0m accrued. They pay out "only ... once a number of criteria, both financial and non-financial, are met" (p. 34).

What this means for the clubMost of a club's wage bill goes on a squad of a few dozen players, on contracts of several years. The wages are fixed whatever happens on the pitch, and a player or coach who leaves early often has to be paid off. The report names "the recruitment and retention of key employees" as a principal risk, "mitigated by long term contracts" (p. 3). Both head coaches were replaced after the season (p. 1). The accounts don't say what the £11.6m exceptional charge relates to.

Not disclosed. The notes don't split players' pay from everyone else's, so there is no figure for the playing wage bill or pay per player. They also don't say whether the £13.0m loyalty and incentive charge sits inside the £255.8m of staff costs.

Buying and selling players

How transfer fees work in the accounts

A transfer fee isn't a cost in the year it's paid. It is recorded as an asset, a "player registration", and written off in equal amounts over the player's contract (p. 27). In 2024/25 that amortisation was £141.2m, on registrations that had cost £696.7m and were valued at £412.9m at the year end (p. 37).

Selling makes a profit on paper. Players sold for £66.8m had £14.2m of value left on the books, so the accounts show a £52.6m profit, down from £82.3m. Those sold included Joe Rodon, Troy Parrott, Emerson Royal, Oliver Skipp, Giovani Lo Celso and Pierre-Emile Højbjerg (pp. 2 and 34).

New registrations cost £149.4m, down from £272.2m (p. 37).

Five years of player tradingBuying players costs more each year than selling them brings in as profit.

Amortisation and football trading costs
Profit on selling players

Five-year review, p3.

Transfer cash in and outNet transfer spending after the year end, to October 2025, was about £158.6m more.

2023/24
2024/25

Paid for playerscash, including instalments on earlier deals£197.2m

Received for playerscash, including instalments on earlier deals£67.0m

Still owed to other clubs at year endwithin a year and later£304.0m

Cash flow statement p25; notes 15 and 16, pp40–41; note 29, p53.

What this means for the clubFees are usually paid in instalments over several years, so the cash leaves long after the deal is signed. At the year end Spurs owed other clubs £304.0m for players, £134.6m of it within a year (pp. 40 and 41), and up to £78.8m more if add-ons such as appearances are triggered (p. 52). Selling a player who came through the academy, or one bought long ago, is almost pure profit in the accounts, because little of the fee is left on the books. After the year end the club spent a net £158.6m more on transfers (p. 53).

Borrowing

The stadium debt

£851.7m of borrowing, secured against the stadium. Most of it is long-term bonds sold privately to US investors: £525m in 2019 and £250m in 2021, plus bank loans (p. 41). The package has an average maturity of 17.6 years and an average coupon of 3.07%, and the last tranche is repaid in 2051. Net debt was £831.2m (p. 2).

The interest itself was flat. Interest on the loans was £29.1m, against £29.3m (p. 34), and £28.9m was paid in cash (p. 25).

The first sizeable repayment is £80.9m of bank loans due between two and five years, with the earliest maturity in March 2028 (pp. 41 and 42).

When the £851.7m of borrowing falls dueAverage maturity 17.6 years at a 3.07% average coupon. The last bond is repaid in 2051.

Borrowings due

Note 16, pp41–42.

What this means for the club£770.7m of the debt is at fixed rates, for an average of 17 more years (p. 43), so the stadium costs about £29m a year in interest whatever happens to rates. Against it, property, plant and equipment, including the stadium, is carried at £1,852.2m, and were revalued up by £23.3m this year, which went through reserves rather than profit (pp. 22 and 49). Cash fell from £79.0m to £20.4m over the year (p. 23).

The finding

Why finance costs rose £22.5m when interest didn't

Finance costs rose £22.5m; the warrant was £23.4mInterest actually paid on £851.7m of borrowing was flat. Finance costs are before £2.5m of finance income.

Interest on the stadium debt
Notional interest: transfer instalments, sponsorship paid upfront, leases
The owner's warrant

Note 7, p34.

Finance costs rose from £50.2m to £72.7m. The "revaluation of the warrant instrument" alone was £23.4m, more than the whole rise (p. 34). It is not interest, and no cash left the club.

What the warrant is. When ENIC put £100m into the club in June 2022, it was also given warrants: rights to more shares, worth 5% of the fully diluted capital at the point of issue and rising by 1.5% a year from 31 March 2025, for ten years. They convert only "on a change of control", or expire after 50 years (p. 40).

Why it hits the loss. The accounting rules treat the warrant as a liability, measured at fair value. As the estimated value of the club's shares goes up, so does the value of the warrant, and the increase is charged to the income statement. It was valued at £52.1m at the year end, up from £28.6m (pp. 23 and 40).

The estimated lifetime value attributed to the warrants is treated as a liability until its potential conversion into permanent equity, although in substance it is part of the permanent equity structure of the Club.
Note 15, p. 40

About a quarter

of the £94.7m loss: the warrant's £23.4m. The other £13.4m of "notional" interest is the cost of paying transfer fees in instalments, and £5.7m relates to sponsorship paid upfront (p. 34).

What this means for the clubThe warrant is a promise of more of the club to its owner, not money owed to a lender. Its value depends on what the club is worth, and on when the warrant is expected to be used. The note says a 5% change in the share value assumptions, together with a two-year later exercise date, could move it by about £17m either way (p. 40). Because conversion happens only on a change of control, the charge grows in the accounts as the club's estimated value grows, even though no one pays it in cash.

Not disclosed. The accounts don't give the share value, the exercise date or the other assumptions behind the £52.1m, only that they are "level 3", meaning based on the club's own estimates rather than market prices (p. 40).

Ownership

Who owns the club, and who pays in

86.91%

ENIC's stake

ENIC Sports Inc, a Bahamas company, held 204.1m of the 234.8m shares at the year end. It bought 5.8m new shares for £35.0m in the year (p. 49).

£100m

After the year end

"The Group has secured an equity injection of £100m subsequent to the year end" (p. 16). On 7 October 2025 ENIC took 13.5m more shares, lifting its stake to 87.62% (p. 53).

Nil

Dividends

No dividend was paid or recommended (p. 12). Money flowed from the owner to the club, not the other way.

The ultimate parent is ENIC Sports and Developments Holdings Limited. The ultimate controlling party is "a discretionary trust of which certain members of Mr J Lewis's family, excluding Mr J Lewis, are potential beneficiaries" (p. 53).

The Executive Chairman left the club after the year end, after nearly 25 years, and a non-executive director became Non-Executive Chairman. A new Chief Executive was appointed (pp. 1 and 53).

What this means for the clubThe going concern statement leans on the owner. The directors' cash forecasts include a factoring arrangement entered into after the year end, which turns money due in future into cash now, the £100m equity injection, and "the ability and willingness of the parent company to provide further equity injections if needed" (p. 16). Cash was down to £20.4m at the year end, and the £35.0m of new shares covered part of a year in which £197.2m went out on players (p. 25).

Background, not from the accountsFactoring means selling money you are owed, such as future transfer instalments or broadcasting payments, to a lender for cash today at a discount. It is common in football. The accounts don't say what was factored or at what cost.

In the directors' words

The risks they name

The negotiation and pricing of broadcasting contracts mitigated by the diversification of revenue streams.
Principal risks, p. 3

The performance and popularity of the first teams mitigated by continued investment in the playing squads.
Principal risks, p. 3

The Group is exposed to foreign currency exchange risk through its player transactions.
Financial risk management, p. 3

In plain termsA club's income moves with results it can't guarantee, while its biggest costs, wages and transfer instalments, are fixed for years. Tottenham's answer is a stadium that earns on non-match days and long-term debt at a fixed rate. The gap is filled by selling players and, in 2024/25 and after, by its owner.

Background, not from the accountsThe Premier League's profit and sustainability rules limit how much a club can lose over three seasons. Some costs, including depreciation of stadiums and training grounds, youth development and women's football, don't count towards the limit. The accounts say only that the club "continues to comply with and support" UEFA and Premier League financial rules (p. 2); they don't give the club's own calculation.

Two years side by side

Year on year

2024/25 against 2023/24Percentage change, one scale. UEFA prize money (£1.3m to £34.7m) is left off: it would flatten everything else.

Revenue£517.8m → £564.9m+9%

Match receipts£105.8m → £126.5m+20%

TV and media£165.9m → £127.0m-23%

Commercial£244.7m → £276.7m+13%

Staff costs£221.9m → £255.8m+15%

Other running costs£161.4m → £197.3m+22%

Player amortisation and trading£135.6m → £146.7m+8%

Profit on selling players£82.3m → £52.6m-36%

Finance costs£50.2m → £72.7m+45%

Average employees820 → 877+7%

Cash at year end£79.0m → £20.4m-74%

Income statement p22, balance sheet p23, notes 2, 3 and 5, pp32–34.

Show the figures as a table

Measure	2024/25	2023/24
Revenue	£564.9m	£517.8m
of which match receipts	£126.5m	£105.8m
of which UEFA prize money	£34.7m	£1.3m
of which TV and media	£127.0m	£165.9m
of which commercial	£276.7m	£244.7m
Staff costs	£255.8m	£221.9m
Staff costs as a share of revenue	45.3%	42.9%
Average employees	877	820
Operating profit before player trading	£43.8m	£74.6m
Player amortisation and football trading	£146.7m	£135.6m
Profit on selling players	£52.6m	£82.3m
Finance costs	£72.7m	£50.2m
of which warrant revaluation	£23.4m	nil
Loss before tax	£120.6m	£26.0m
Loss after tax	£94.7m	£26.2m
Borrowings	£851.7m	£851.4m
Net debt	£831.2m	£772.5m
Cash at year end	£20.4m	£79.0m
New shares issued to ENIC	£35.0m	nil

2023/24 had no European football; the £1.3m was a final payment for the season before. Staff costs exclude the exceptional £11.6m (2023/24: £1.5m).

Quick answers

Questions about Tottenham Hotspur

How does Tottenham Hotspur really make its money?

Why did Tottenham's finance costs rise in 2024/25?

Finance costs rose from £50.2m to £72.7m. Interest on the £851.7m of borrowing was flat at £29.1m. The rise came from a £23.4m increase in the fair value of warrants held by the owner, ENIC, which give it the right to more shares on a change of control. No cash was paid.

How much did Tottenham make from selling players?

£52.6m of profit on player sales in 2024/25, down from £82.3m. Players were sold for £66.8m and had £14.2m of value left on the books. Against that, amortisation of transfer fees and other football trading costs were £146.7m.

What are Tottenham's wages as a share of revenue?

Staff costs were £255.8m in 2024/25, 45.3% of revenue of £564.9m, up from 42.9%. There was also an exceptional £11.6m for onerous employment contracts. The accounts don't split players' pay from other staff.

Who owns Tottenham Hotspur?

ENIC Sports Inc, a Bahamas company, held 86.91% of the shares at 30 June 2025, rising to 87.62% after it subscribed for more shares in October 2025. The ultimate parent is ENIC Sports and Developments Holdings Limited, controlled by a discretionary trust whose potential beneficiaries are certain members of Mr J Lewis's family, excluding Mr J Lewis himself.

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